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h i g h l i g h t s
• Voters need to choose between a reform and the status quo.
• There is a binary state of the world, and voters receive private signals about it.
• Some voters prefer the reform in the first state, others – in the second.
• When fractionalisation is sufficiently high, an equilibrium exists in which almost all voters vote sincerely.
JEL classification:
C72
D72
D82
Keywords:
Voting
Information
Conflicting preferences
Fractionalisation
a b s t r a c t
Much of the theoretical literature on voting with private information finds that voters do not vote sincerely at the equilibrium. Yet there is little 
empirical support for this result. This paper shows that when the electorate is sufficiently divided, sincere voting is an equilibrium strategy for an 
arbitrarily large proportion of voters.
1. Introduction
When imperfectly informed voters go to polls, an intuitive
conjecturemight be that they vote sincerely – select the alternative
that they would like to win, given their information. Austen-
Smith and Banks (1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997)
demonstrated, however, that sincere voting is not in general a
rational strategy. Yet there is little evidence that voters in real-
life elections act contrary to their private signals. In fact, existing
empirical evidence suggests that voters do vote sincerely (Degan
and Merlo, 2009).
This paper provides game-theoretic foundations for the sincere
voting hypothesis. In the paper, voters choose between a reform
and the status quo. There is a binary state of the world and two
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types of voters. Each voter receives an imperfect continuous signal
about the state. A voter wants the reform to be chosen if and only if
the state corresponds to his type. Hence, the electorate is fraction-
alised – voters of the two types have conflicting preferences. This
is different from the standard setup,1 in which changing the state
moves voters’ preferred alternative in the same direction.2,3
The paper shows that as fractionalisation becomes sufficiently
large, the expected share of voters who vote against their private
signals goes to zero. The result holds for any size of the electorate,
any threshold voting rule, any signal structure,4 and any prior
1 See e.g. Koriyama and Szentes (2009), Goertz andManiquet (2014), Ellis (2016).
2 In Goertz and Maniquet (2011), Bouton and Castanheira (2012); Bouton et al.
(2016), and Ferrari (2016), some voters are partisans and always prefer one of the
alternatives – but preferences of voters who care about the state are still monotone
in the state.
3 Kimand Fey (2007) and Bhattacharya (2013) examine a settingwith adversarial
preferences, but they study large elections and do not focus on sincere voting
behaviour.
4 Subject to some technical assumptions.
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belief. Hence, even in very asymmetric settings, sincere voting is
an equilibrium if the electorate is sufficiently divided.
Conflicting preferences are present in many situations. For in-
stance, a trade reform can increase wages in some sectors while
decreasing them in others. A voter will support the reform in a
referendum if and only if wages in his sector will rise. Similarly,
in an election there may be uncertainty about the challenger’s
preferred policies relative to those of the incumbent. Left-wing
voters will prefer the challenger if she is more left-wing than
the incumbent, while right-wing voters will have the opposite
preferences.
Several other papers look at situations in which sincere voting
is an equilibrium strategy. In Krishna and Morgan (2012), sincere
voting can happen when voting is voluntary. In Damiano et al.
(2015), sincere voting is driven by the possibility of a recount.
In Acharya and Meirowitz (2016), some voters are uninformed,
and when their number can be large, informed voters vote sin-
cerely. Ferrari (2016) studies sincere voting in a settingwith public
signals and partisan voters. In contrast, this paper focuses not
on voting procedure or information structure, but on conflicting
preferences as a factor that induces sincere voting.
2. Model
An electorate of n + 1 voters vote on a reform. Each voter i
has a type xi ∈ {0, 1}, which represents her preferences. There is
an unknown state of the world ω ∈ {0, 1}; let Pr (ω = 1) = p.
If the reform is approved, voter i receives a payoff u (xi, ω). Let
u (xi, ω) = 1 if xi = ω; and u (xi, ω) = −1 if xi ̸= ω. Thus, each
voter gains from the reform if the state corresponds to her type,
and loses otherwise.5 If the reform is rejected, each voter receives
a payoff of zero.
In the beginning, nature selects the state. Then nature draws
voter types; each type is drawn independently, and the probability
that a voter’s type is 1 is γ ∈ (0, 1). We can think of γ as ameasure
of fractionalisation: the closer γ is to 0.5, the more fractionalised
the electorate is.6
Each voter knows γ , but does not know the realised types, other
than her own.7 After observing her type, each voter i receives an
independent private signal si. Signals are distributed continuously
with full support on some set C ⊆ R. Let Fω and fω be, respectively,
the cdf and the density of si conditional on the state being ω ∈
{0, 1}. I will make two assumptions about the signal distributions:
1. Monotone likelihood ratio: h (si) ≡ f0(si)f1(si) is strictly increas-
ing in si.
2. Non-triviality: there exist signals s, s′ such that h (s) <
p
1−p < h
(
s′
)
.
The first assumption says that the inverse of the likelihood ratio
exists and that the state is more likely to be zero when signal
realisation is high. The second assumption says that the signal is
potentially informative: there exist signal realisations underwhich
5 Thus, no voter favours or opposes the reform in both states. Note that if such
voters were present, they would always vote the same way at an equilibrium.
Hence, introducing them has the same effect as varying the voting rule.
6 For a society consisting of different groups, the index of fractionalisation rep-
resents the probability that two randomly drawn individuals belong to different
groups. When there are two groups, fractionalisation is higher when the groups are
more similar in size. See Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005).
7 We can think of γ as representing a distribution of voters’ types reported by
a noisy opinion poll. Alternatively, if n is small – for example, when the decision is
made by a committee –we can think of γ as reflecting a distribution of typeswithin
a population, which is known (for example, from polls). Then n + 1 members of
that population are selected into the committee. If n is large, γ may correspond to a
distribution of types reported by a noisy opinion poll. On the other hand, if n→∞,
γ simply becomes a known distribution of voters’ preferences.
the posterior belief that the state is zero is above 0.5, and also signal
realisations under which the posterior belief that the state is zero
is below 0.5.
After observing her signal, each voter votes for or against the
reform. The reform is adopted if the number of votes in favour of
it is strictly larger than some number k. Thus, k = n2 represents
simple majority rule, while k = n represents unanimity rule. After
the vote, payoffs are realised depending on whether the reform is
adopted and on the state.
Denote by ai (xi, si) ∈ [0, 1] voter i’s action (the probability
of voting for the reform) at the equilibrium as a function of her
signal and her type. As usual in voting games, this game has trivial
equilibria in which no voter is ever pivotal. Hence, the analysis will
focus on equilibria in which each voter is pivotal with a positive
probability and which are symmetric in the sense that ai (xi, si) =
a (xi, si) ,∀i (that is, in which two voters with the same type and
the same signal select the same action).8 I will call these symmetric
pivotal equilibria.
3. Results
3.1. Sincere voting
A sincere voter only considers her signal when making the
decision. Hence, she backs the reform if and only if
E [u (xi, ω) | si] ≥ 0.
Given a signal si, we have Pr (ω = 0 | si) = (1−p)f0(si)(1−p)f0(si)+pf1(si) . Hence,
if xi = 0, voter i backs the reform whenever (1− p) f0 (si) −
pf1 (si) ≥ 0, i.e. whenever h (si) ≥ p1−p . Similarly, if xi = 1, i backs
the reform whenever pf1 (si) − (1− p) f0 (si) ≥ 0, i.e. whenever
h (si) ≤ p1−p .
3.2. Equilibrium voting
Suppose that each voter behaves strategically. Then she knows
that her vote can only affect the outcome if she is pivotal – i.e. if
exactly k other voters have voted in favour of the reform. Denote
this event by piv. A voter iwho is strategic will vote to support the
reform if and only if
E [u (xi, ω) | si , piv] ≥ 0.
At equilibrium, let qω denote the probability that a randomly
selected voter votes for the reform when the true state is ω.
Therefore, when ω = 0, each voter is pivotal with probability(
n
k
)
qk0(1− q0)n−k; and when ω = 1, a voter is pivotal with
probability
(
n
k
)
qk1(1− q1)n−k. Then the following holds:
Lemma 1. In any symmetric pivotal equilibrium, q0 and q1 are
distinct from 0 and 1.
Proof. Suppose that the opposite holds. Because signal distribu-
tions have full support, qω = 0 or qω = 1 means that a voter
votes the same way upon receiving any signal. Then q1 = q0. If
q0 = q1 = 1, the probability that a voter is pivotal is either 0 (if
k ̸= n), or 1 (if k = n). Similarly, if q0 = q1 = 0, the probability
that a voter is pivotal is either 0 (if k ̸= 0), or 1 (if k = 0). If the
probability that a voter is pivotal is 0, this is not a symmetric pivotal
equilibrium. If that probability is 1, the best response of each voter
is to vote sincerely – but then non-triviality ensures that his vote
varies with signal, so q0 and q1 cannot equal 0 or 1. Thus, qω = 0
or qω = 1 leads to a contradiction.
8 It will be shown that an equilibrium with these properties exists.
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Having established this, we can describe voters’ equilibrium
strategy with the following lemma, the proof of which is in the
Appendix:
Lemma 2. In every symmetric pivotal equilibrium, the strategy of
every voter i satisfies the following:
• ai (0, si) = 1 if and only if h (si) ≥ M
• ai (1, si) = 1 if and only if h (si) ≤ M
where
M ≡ p
1− p
qk1(1− q1)n−k
qk0(1− q0)n−k
.
Recall that Lemma 1 ensures that q0, q1 ∈ (0, 1) – hence,
M exists and is distinct from zero. Note that M is a function of
q0 and q1, which are endogenous to the equilibrium. At a sym-
metric pivotal equilibrium, a voter backs the reform if she is of
type 0 and receives a signal above h−1 (M), or if she is of type 1
and receives a signal below h−1 (M).9 Thus, q0 = (1− γ )
(
1 −
F0
[
h−1 (M)
])+γ F0 [h−1 (M)], and q1 = (1− γ ) (1−F1 [h−1 (M)])
+ γ F1
[
h−1 (M)
]
. Rearranging and substituting into the expression
forM yields the following equality:
M = p
1− p
(
1− γ − (1− 2γ ) F1
[
h−1 (M)
]
1− γ − (1− 2γ ) F0
[
h−1 (M)
])k
×
(
γ + (1− 2γ ) F1
[
h−1 (M)
]
γ + (1− 2γ ) F0
[
h−1 (M)
])n−k. (1)
This equality must hold at any symmetric pivotal equilibrium.
Furthermore, for any value of M for which (1) holds, no player
wants to deviate from strategies described in Lemma 2. Thus, if (1)
holds for some value ofM , then that value determines a symmetric
pivotal equilibrium. The following lemma, the proof of which is in
the Appendix, proves that such a value ofM exists:
Lemma 3. Equality (1) holds for at least one value of M.
This implies the existence of a symmetric pivotal equilibrium.
3.3. Sincere voting at the equilibrium
Consider a symmetric pivotal equilibrium. From the results in
Section 3.1 and Lemma 2 it follows that if si ≥ h−1
(
p
1−p
)
and
si ≥ h−1 (M), then at the equilibrium a strategic voter i is voting
sincerely, backing the reform if xi = 0 and opposing the reform
if xi = 1. If si ≤ h−1
(
p
1−p
)
and si ≤ h−1 (M), voter i also votes
sincerely, supporting the reform if xi = 1 and opposing it if xi = 0.
A voter is not voting sincerely at the equilibrium if and only if
her signal falls between h−1
(
p
1−p
)
and h−1 (M). Letµω denote the
probability that a randomly chosen voter is not voting sincerely
when the true state is ω ∈ {0, 1}. Then,
µω =
⏐⏐⏐⏐Fω [h−1 (M)]− Fω [h−1 ( p1− p
)]⏐⏐⏐⏐ .
The following proposition then establishes the main result of
the paper:
Proposition. At any symmetric pivotal equilibrium, lim
γ→ 12µω = 0
for any ω ∈ {0, 1} and any p, n, k, F0, F1.
9 In the subsequent proof of Lemma 3 it will be shown that h−1 (M) is well-
defined at equilibrium.
Proof. If γ → 12 , then for any M the right-hand side of (1)
approaches p1−p . Thus, at the limit,M = p1−p , and µω = 0.
In words, at a symmetric pivotal equilibrium, the expected
fraction of voters not voting sincerely becomes vanishingly small
as the electorate becomes sufficiently fractionalised.
4. Conclusions
The paper has examined the behaviour of imperfectly informed
voters. Much of the previous literature concludes that in such
settings, voters will act against their private information. This
paper shows thatwhen voters have conflicting preferences, sincere
voting can be an equilibrium. In particular, when the electorate is
sufficiently divided, an arbitrarily large fraction of voters is voting
sincerely. This result holds for any prior, any size of the electorate,
any voting rule, and any pair of signal distributions that satisfies
the assumptions in Section 2.
Appendix
A.1. Proof of Lemma 2
By Bayes’ law, we have
Pr (ω = 0 | si, piv)
=
(1− p) f0 (si)
(
n
k
)
qk0(1− q0)n−k
(1− p) f0 (si)
(
n
k
)
qk0(1− q0)n−k + pf1 (si)
(
n
k
)
qk1(1− q1)n−k
or
Pr (ω = 0 | si, piv) = h (si)h (si)+M .
Then we have:
E [u (0, ω) | si, piv] = h (si)−Mh (si)+M
E [u (1, ω) | si, piv] = M − h (si)h (si)+M .
The conditions under which these are greater than zero are
equivalent to the conditions in Lemma 2.
A.2. Proof of Lemma 3
Denote the right-hand side of (1) by B (M). It is defined when
h−1 (M) exists – that is, when M ∈ (inf [h (s)] , sup [h (s)]). When
M → inf [h (s)] = h (inf [C]), we have h−1 (M) → inf (C).
Then F0
[
h−1 (M)
]
and F1
[
h−1 (M)
]
both go to 0, hence B (M) →
p
1−p . Similarly, when M → sup [h (s)] = h (sup [C]), we have
h−1 (M) → sup (C). Then F0
[
h−1 (M)
]
and F1
[
h−1 (M)
]
both go
to 1, hence B (M)→ p1−p . Thus, whenM ∈ (inf [h (s)] , sup [h (s)]),
the functionM − B (M) takes values close to inf [h (s)] − p1−p , and
also values close to sup [h (s)] − p1−p . Non-triviality assumption
implies that inf [h (s)] < p1−p < sup [h (s)]. Thus, the func-
tion M − B (M) takes both negative and positive values on the
(inf [h (s)] , sup [h (s)]) interval, and since this function is contin-
uous, it should by Bolzano’s theorem also take a value of zero on
this interval. Therefore, there exists at least one value ofM atwhich
M = B (M), i.e. at which (1) holds.
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